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The extent and nature of contracting in the wine
supply-chain when moral hazard is present1
Abstract
This paper explores an optimal sharing contract between a grape grower and a
winery, when a risk-averse grower allocates eﬀorts among multiple activities that
diﬀer in measurability, while double-sided moral hazard is assumed to be present.
The contract allows for asymmetric quality contributions by the grape grower and
the winery, and is conditioned on both the value of joint production outcomes as
well as on the performance evaluation from monitoring. The model is motivated
by the use of residual claimancy in the wine industry. Through comparative
static analysis of the Pareto optimal share, the model provides insights into the
extent and nature of contracting in the wine industries of Australia, New Zealand,
California and Spain.
Keywords: incentive contract, residual claimancy, wine, double-moral
hazard, multi-tasking
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1The choice of appropriate performance indicators is one of the central problems or-
ganizations face in implementing eﬀective incentive contracts. It is often diﬃcult to
observe and measure actions of agents per se, but, as agency theory has long estab-
lished, it is particularly critical for a principal to ﬁnd performance indicators such that
the agent's actions are aligned with the principal's objectives. The alignment problem
can be ampliﬁed when agents perform multiple tasks (Holmström and Milgrom 1991).
Frequently agents not only need to determine the intensity of their eﬀorts, but also
need to allocate their eﬀorts among multiple activities: agricultural producers need to
allocate their eﬀorts across a variety of tasks that may diﬀer in their impact on the
ﬁnal good's quality.
When agents perform multiple tasks, issues of internal organizational design may arise
for a variety of reasons. First, due to eﬀort substitution, and hence the technological
relationship between eﬀorts, second due to direct conﬂicts between tasks such that
their separation is required, and third due to the absence of explicit incentive schemes
(Holmström 1999). The multi-tasking literature has established that under these con-
ditions, the performance measures which the principal relies on, may not align the
agent with the principal's objectives. In such instances the optimal contract oﬀers
weaker overall incentives to ensure that the principal's objectives and the performance
indicators remain as closely aligned as possible (Holmström and Milgrom 1991).
This paper focuses on an outcome-based sharing incentive contract in the wine industry
where residual claimancy is used to align principal and agent, and where both agent
(grape grower) and principal (winery) are assumed to perform multiple tasks. It is
assumed that a grape grower contributes to ﬁnal wine quality in terms of production
eﬀorts, and the winery contributes in terms of processing and marketing eﬀorts. Since
eﬀorts are mutually imperfectly observed and their impact on ﬁnal bottle quality can
only be imperfectly measured, there is scope for opportunism on both sides.
2The objectives of the paper are to derive comparative static results for the optimal
sharing rule in a model when contractibility, the grower's risk aversion and the grower's
disutility of eﬀort vary, in the presence of double-sided moral hazard and multitasking
on both the grower's and the winery's part.
Our model has several desirable features. It allows for asymmetric quality contributions
by principal and agent. This is desirable in the context of the wine industry, since
winemakers may have a diﬀerent scope to impact ﬁnal bottle quality in terms of making
`bad' wine out of `good' grapes, compared to the grower's scope of aﬀecting the winery's
processing eﬀorts. Monitoring is allowed for and rationalized on several accounts. First,
theory suggests that outcome-conditioning is not used in isolation, but in combination
with input-monitoring, as long as monitoring is informative (Holmström 1979). Thus,
varying monitoring intensity can be explained through the suﬃcient statistic result
(Hart and Holmström 1987).1 Second, a single grower may supply multiple grape
varieties, or multiple growers may supply their grapes to a single winery creating scope
for free-riding.2 Third, both parties may be reluctant to condition the sharing rule
only on the market valuation of the ﬁnal bottle, since market risk and other exogenous
factors make it desirable to construct a performance measure that is more closely tied
to both the individual grower's and winery's contributions.
The model accounts for monitoring assessment grades as part of the compensation
scheme. We assume that monitoring activity delivers reports (grades) which then
enter the performance indicator. This is a desirable model feature since setting in-
tense incentives and measuring performance carefully can be Edgeworth complements
(Milgrom and Roberts 1995), and because we observe that the amount of monitoring
of grape growers and the intensity of incentives are chosen together in grape supply
contracts (Fraser (2005); Boyd, Evans, and Quigley (2000)).3
3Our model provides also scope for moral hazard at the level of the winery, where
opportunism can emerge when grape growers are dependent on the marketing and
quality assessment of the winery. As Fraser (2003) suggests, wineries have incentives
to underestimate grape quality, since this lowers the price they have to pay to supplying
growers.4
Several other aspects diﬀerentiate the model in this paper from previous analyses of
double-moral hazard and multi-tasking. As in Holmström and Milgrom (1991), we
show that the desirability of providing incentives for any one activity decreases with
the diﬃculty of measuring performance in any other activity that makes competing
demands on an agent's eﬀort. But whereas Holmström and Milgrom (1991) allow for a
risk-averse agent in the presence of hidden action of agents only, this paper considers
double-sided moral hazard and introduces sharing contracts to provide joint incentives.
The two latter assumptions are also explored in Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995)
and Brickley (2002). However, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) explore the nature
of share contracts in franchising in the absence of multi-tasking, input monitoring
and a risk-averse agent. Although Brickley (2002) allows for risk averse agents, the
paper considers neither multitasking nor monitoring. In contrast to the two previous
papers, our model includes input-conditioning through eﬀort monitoring and assumes
multitasking and a risk-averse agent. Our model speciﬁcations also permit us to explore
strict sharing in double-moral hazard settings when agents are risk-averse.
Through comparative static analysis of the Pareto optimal share, the model provides
insights into explicit incentive contracts employed in the wine sector. The model shows
that with increasing magnitude of the grower's disutility of eﬀort, a decreasing Pareto
optimal share goes to the grape grower. It demonstrates that greater uncertainty of
measuring performance results in a smaller Pareto optimal share that goes to the grape
grower. As the grape grower's risk aversion goes to inﬁnity, the model predicts that the
4grape grower's share goes to zero. If there are observation errors in measuring grape
grower and winery eﬀorts, and if the grape grower is risk averse, it is shown that the
Pareto optimal rate lies strictly between zero and one.
The paper is closely related to the theoretical multi-tasking literature, which has ex-
plored distortions of eﬀorts in response to measurement bias when measurability dif-
fers between multiple tasks (Holmström and Milgrom (1991); Holmström and Milgrom
(1994)), or distortions of eﬀorts that may stem from imperfect proxies for the relation-
ship between the marginal products of the agent's actions and the marginal products
of the performance measure (Baker 1992).5
There are several multi-tasking studies with empirical applications to which this paper
is related. Slade (1996) explores how interrelationships among tasks that operators
of gasoline-service stations provide aﬀect the choice of compensation contracts. Lu-
porini and Parigi (1996) study Italian sharecropping contracts over subsistence and
cash crops in order to explain the phenomenon of the reintroduction of feudal clauses
in sharecropping contracts in the second half of the nineteenth century. Based on grape
production data from Renaissance Italy, Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) ﬁnd empirical
evidence of multitasking eﬀects in wine production as determinants of contract type
and contract length in the context of a multi-annual optimization problem of grape
growers.
Share contracts have perhaps been explored most prominently in the sharecropping lit-
erature (e.g. Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)), and in the context of franchising (e.g. Dana
and Spier (2001)). Sharing contracts have been motivated in several ways. Stiglitz
(1974) has focused on pure risk sharing to motivate sharing arrangements when both
agent and principal are risk averse and beneﬁt from insurance through sharecropping.
Given unveriﬁable input use, one-sided moral hazard has frequently been put forward to
5rationalize share contracts. Stiglitz (1974), and Mathewson and Winter (1985) in the
franchising context, suggest that the trade-oﬀ between the provision of insurance and
the provision of incentives rationalizes sharing contracts as second-best when agents
are risk-averse. Standard agency models based on the ﬁrst-order approach predict zero
sharing (royalty) rates when agents are assumed risk-neutral, when there is hidden
action on the agent's part, and when a non-binding wealth constraint is assumed. But
when agents are risk-averse (Holmström 1979) or when double-sided moral hazard is
assumed, royalty rates are predicted to be positive and a sharing contract can be an ap-
propriate second-best contract in addressing underlying double moral hazard problems
(Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995); Stiglitz (1974)).
Double-sided moral hazard as an explanation for sharing contracts has a long history in
the economics of sharecropping (Stiglitz (1974); Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)). Eswaran
and Kotwal (1985) explore market imperfections in inputs and put forward the hypothe-
sis that non-tradable, non-contractible inputs can be eﬃciently pooled in sharecropping
arrangements. But double moral hazard has also been put forward to explain revenue
sharing in the context of franchising and supply chain contracts. Lal (1990) explores
the implications of an agent's inability to observe the eﬀorts of the principal (fran-
chisor) when brand name investment matters. Rubin (1978) and Bhattacharyya and
Lafontaine (1995) have shown that under the assumption that both agent and principal
are risk neutral, the optimal contract involves revenue sharing due to the presence of
double-moral hazard.6 Brickley (2002) provides empirical support for the double moral
hazard explanation for share contracts in a study on the impact of state franchise ter-
mination laws on franchise contracts. In the context of supply-chain contracts and
within a double-moral hazard setting, Corbett, DeCroix, and Ha (2001) show that the
principal (the supplier) can always induce the optimal second-best equilibrium with a
linear shared-savings contract over input use.7
6The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section (2) provides some back-
ground to the wine industry. Section (3) develops a sharing contract under the assump-
tion of multitasking, double-moral hazard and eﬀort monitoring. Section (4) concludes.
Background: contractual use in the wine industry
Formal wine grape supply contracts are used extensively in many key wine producing
regions, including Australia (Fraser 2005), California (Goodhue, Heien, Lee, and Sum-
ner (2004); Goodhue, Heien, Lee, and Sumner (2002); Bedwell (2000); Moulton (1988)),
Argentina (Fares, Ayouz, and Martin 2002); Brazil (Zylbersztajn and Miele (2002)),
New Zealand (Boyd, Evans, and Quigley 2000), France (Montaigne and Sidlovits 2003)
and Spain (Olmos 2008). As a result of producer surveys, the use of contracts has
perhaps been best documented in the case of California (Goodhue, Heien, Lee, and
Sumner 2004) and Australia (Fraser 2005).8
Industry structure
The wine industry in some of these key producing regions has expanded signiﬁcantly
over the past two decades, resulting in changes in market structure. In Australia, the
number of growers has increased by more than 30 per cent to 4,822 between 1994 and
1998. At the same time, the number of wineries expanded by nearly 50 per cent to 1,197
establishments (Shepherd and O'Donell 2001). By 2005, the industry had expanded to
approximately 6,000 grape growers and 2,000 wineries (RMN (2007); AWBC (2007)).
In California, there were 2,275 wineries and 4,600 grape growers in 2005 (Wine Institute
2007b); compared to 750 wineries and about 5,600 growers in 1987 (Wine Institute
2007a, Moulton (1988)). Thus, since vineyards had also expanded considerably (1988:
297,000 acres; 2005: 445,141 acres; The Wineinstitute 2007), the growers' average
vineyard size has increased signiﬁcantly (by 73%). At the same time, wine production
7has become more consolidated over time in both regions. In 1987 the 3 largest wineries
accounted for 59.2% of California wine shipments (Moulton 1988), whereas the top
three wineries were responsible for over 60% of wine shipments in 2003 (Heien and
Martin 2003). In Australia, the four largest wineries accounted for 66% of production
in 2004 (Aylward 2004), whereas in 1995, seven companies accounted for about 75% of
Australia's wine production (Scales, Croser, and Freebairn 1995).
These ﬁgures raise the question of whether the bargaining power between grape grow-
ers and wineries is typically evenly or unevenly distributed when grape contracts are
settled.9 Evidence from California, New Zealand and Chile suggests that bargaining
power is not only a function of scale (on both the grower's and winery's side), but
also a function of perceived quality, as greater grower bargaining power was found in
high quality grape regions (Moulton (1988); Gwynne (2006)).10 Davis and Ahmadi-
Esfahani (2006) suggest that a recent grape excess supply in Australia may also have
been caused by lucrative grape contracts, which implies that wineries have not consis-
tently extracted rents at the expense of growers. Evidence from an Australian study
(Scales, Croser, and Freebairn 1995) suggests that the bargaining power of wineries,
although generally of concern to growers, has at times shifted toward growers.11 Scales,
Croser, and Freebairn (1995) report that grape growers' bargaining power was found
to have strengthened during times of growing export opportunities for wine, and when
alternative markets expanded for grapes (i.e. markets for dried vine fruits). Other
documented evidence on the extent of bargaining power diﬀerences and their price or
contracting implications are scarce. A study of the New York State wine industry
used a small survey among wineries to econometrically explore the relationship be-
tween grape prices and prices of wine (Hefetz and White 1999). The study concludes
that The clear and signiﬁcant relations between retail prices and grape prices result
from the sharing of revenue from wine sales between the grape growers and the wine
8makers. (p.16). Thus, the study provides an example where equality in contract
implementation between growers and wineries seems to have occurred.
Type of contract and contractual provisions
Surveys in the main grape growing regions of Australia and California found that
85% (2001) and 72% (1999), respectively, of growers have written contracts (Fraser
(2005); Goodhue, Heien, and Lee (1999)). These contracts are typically written over
the supply of bulk wine, over grape must or over fresh grapes. In California, fresh
grape contracts between grape growers and wine processors are most frequently used
(Goodhue, Heien, and Lee 1999). From Fraser (2005) and Boyd, Evans, and Quigley
(2000) we have evidence that these contracts have typically a relatively low degree of
contract customization, which supports our modeling assumption of simple, uniform
linear compensation schemes.
Typical contract provisions include speciﬁc production practice (viticultural manage-
ment) provisions, price incentives (bonuses/penalities for quality attributes of fresh
grapes), and monitoring provisions (Olmos (2008); Fraser (2005); Benavente (2004);
Goodhue, Heien, Lee, and Sumner (2002); Boyd, Evans, and Quigley (2000); Moulton
(1988)), or a subset thereof. The use and documentation of chemical pesticides in
grape production is receiving increasing attention, as evidence from Spain, Australia
and California suggests (Olmos (2008); Fraser (2005); Goodhue, Heien, and Lee (1999),
respectively). A study from Hungary suggests that contracts are oﬀered on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis (Sidlovits and Kator 2008), which supports one of our basic model
assumptions.12
Notably, we have no evidence that grape supply contracts control for exogenous climate
variables (rainfall, temperature), although this could be expected from Holmström
(1979), as well as from previous empirical studies (Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Lalonde
9(1995); Byron and Ashenfelter (1995)). Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Lalonde (1995)
and Byron and Ashenfelter (1995) have shown that these climate variables can have a
signiﬁcant impact on price and wine quality.
Grape grower monitoring, in the form of winery ﬁeldmen who monitor grower vineyards
throughout the growing season, is used extensively by the wineries (Olmos (2008);
Fraser (2005); Zylbersztajn and Miele (2005); Goodhue, Heien, Lee, and Sumner
(2002); Boyd, Evans, and Quigley (2000)).13 Such monitoring eﬀort can take many
forms, including simple non-binding production advice as well as a strict grading of
visible performance indicators that is used as part of the compensation scheme. As
a result of such monitoring eﬀorts, wineries have been observed to generate historical
performance scorecards for individual growers, which are then used when new contracts
are put into place.14 However, we have also evidence for winery monitoring, such that
growers infer winery processing and marketing eﬀorts from trade publications, win-
ery reports and other industry participants. Wineries also submit reports to growers
about the composition of their grape juice, or about results from wine tastings (Omond
(2003); Montaigne and Sidlovits (2003)). Benavente (2004) emphasizes that sharing
information within the industry is the norm today - mainly between oenologists and
grape growers. This allows the industry to be updated on the quality of wines, pro-
cedures and technologies applied by diﬀerent wineries. This is happening not only in
Chile but worldwide ... . (p.16).
Evidence from New Zealand suggests that mixed payment schedules composed of a base
price and an incentive-related margin are common, where the grower compensation for
a particular grape variety is related to the price of wine produced from that particular
grape variety (Boyd, Evans, and Quigley 2000).15
Grapegrower contracts that condition grower compensation on wine retail prices is a
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form of residual claimancy that is documented for Australia, France, New Zealand and
California (Fraser (2002); Montaigne and Sidlovits (2003); Boyd, Evans, and Quigley
(2000); Moulton (1988)). Australian evidence suggests that about 20 percent of grape
contracts use residual claimancy with reference to wine retail prices (Fraser 2002).
Current ﬁgures for bottle price contracts in California are not available, although this
ﬁgure has been estimated to be under 5 percent during the 1980's (Moulton 1988). Ex-
act ﬁgures for France and New Zealand are also not available (Montaigne and Sidlovits
(2003); Boyd, Evans, and Quigley (2000)). Documented evidence for the use of residual
claimancy in other regions is missing.
For those regions in which residual claimancy is used, bottle retail prices enter the
compensation scheme in diﬀerent ways. In the U.S. and New Zealand, retail bottle
prices are used from wines that originated from the same vineyard or the same grape
variety, yet from wines that were released in the previous year (Moulton (1988); Boyd,
Evans, and Quigley (2000)). In Australia, grape growers are compensated based on
retail prices of the forthcoming bottles from the current vintage (Fraser 2005). In
France, an average retail price is used to derive an index formula, based on forthcoming
bottles from the current vintage, as well as from past vintages (from the same vineyard
or grape variety) (Montaigne and Sidlovits 2003). In sum, we observe a variety of ways
through which residual claimancy is implemented in the wine industry.
Model
The following model assumes a one-shot game, in which a risk averse grape grower
contracts with a risk-neutral winery over the supply of fresh grapes. In addition to
modeling multiple tasks on the grower's and the winery's side, we allow for moral hazard
on both the grower's and the winery's part. Two factors are assumed to contribute to
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the performance indicator according to which both winery and grower agree to share
the outcome from production, processing and marketing. First, the market valuation
of the outcome from grape production and wine processing, thus reﬂecting residual
claimancy. Second, information from eﬀort monitoring is also assumed to enter the
performance indicator.
The model shows that a sharing contract can provide incentives to both principal
(winery) and agent (grower) such that the eﬃcient contract maximizes surplus for all
incentive compatible contracts.16 We consider an agency relationship in which a grape
grower allocates his total production eﬀorts amongst several activities n = 1, ..., N ,
where the vector of eﬀorts is denoted by a = (a1, ..., aN). The winery allocates its
processing and marketing eﬀorts amongst activities m = 1, ...,M , where the vector
of eﬀorts is given by e = (e1, ..., eM) and a ∈ RN+ , e ∈ RM+ , respectively. For both
grower and winery, each element of his eﬀort vector measures managerial eﬀort in a
distinct activity (variable inputs), such that w =
[
aT eT
]
. Assume that eﬀorts are
observed with noise,
w˜ =
 a
e
+
 εa,w
εe,w
 , such that w˜ =
 a˜
e˜
 . (1)
We assume the presence of observational error in measuring quality outcomes, such
that the realization of εw =
[
εTa,w ε
T
e,w
]
is unobserved by both parties; the degree
of the winery's inference problem with regards to the grower eﬀorts a is given by the
variance of εa,w, and the degree of the grower's inference problem with regards to the
winery eﬀorts e is given by the variance of εe,w (mean zero and covariance matrix Σw,
ε ∼ N(0,Σw)). An example for the former case could be the diﬃculty of the winery
to observe the actual pesticide applications employed by the grower after signing the
contract, which may deviate from the contractually speciﬁed pesticide applications.
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Symmetrically, the grower may observe the marketing campaign of the winery in the
marketplace, but the actual marketing budget that was allocated to speciﬁc wines (and
the corresponding grape batches from a given grower) may be diﬃcult to observe by
the grower.
Further, we allow for a second source of randomness. We assume that both the winery
and the grower are exposed to exogenous shocks that make it impossible for both
sides to perfectly control their contribution to wine and grape quality, respectively:
εk =
[
εTa,k ε
T
e,k
]
, with mean zero and covariance matrix Σk, ε ∼ N(0,Σk). These
shocks provide scope for moral hazard, because although grower and winery cannot
aﬀect the states-of-nature per se, they can aﬀect the outcome realized in those states.
The inference problem of the winery with regards to the grower's eﬀorts, and the
grower's inference problem with regards to the winery's eﬀorts relates therefore to the
potential of mitigating or enhancing the wine quality outcome in an unobserved manner
in certain states-of-nature.17
Considering both sources of randomness, the wine quality outcome from eﬀort alloca-
tion becomes,
q = Φw + Φεw + εk, (2)
where Φ denotes a matrix of productivities. It is the objective of both grower and
winery to specify a joint performance indicator that relies on this outcome, q. To
achieve this, we can model the relationship between eﬀorts and quality outcomes more
explicitly. This has two advantages. First, it allows us to transform grape quality
attributes into monetary values. Second, this enables us to take production, processing
and marketing realities into account. We generally observe that a combination of
inputs (production, processing, marketing) is responsible in determining a given quality
attribute. For example, the residual sugar level of the grapes (Brix) is inﬂuenced by
13
irrigation, weeding and pruning. Assuming that Φw˜ = y and y =
[
yTa y
T
e
]
, we
have  Φaaw˜a + Φaew˜e
Φeaw˜a + Φeew˜e
 =
 ya
ye
 . (3)
In this way, equation (3) tells us how grower and winery eﬀorts translate into quality
attributes of the wine. As an example, consider Φaaw˜a, which tells us how a grower's
eﬀort aﬀects quality attributes that he delivers to the ﬁnal product. Also, Φeaw˜a
reveals that it is not necessarily the case that the way in which grower eﬀorts aﬀect the
winery's quality contribution is symmetric to the way by which winery eﬀorts aﬀect
the grower's quality contributions. The extent to which wineries can aﬀect the ﬁnal
bottle quality by making `bad' wine out of `good' grapes may diﬀer from the extent
to which grape growers can aﬀect the processing eﬀorts of the winery, and thus ﬁnal
bottle quality.18
Further, we assume that a vector za denotes grower characteristics that are observable
by the winery, including characteristics such as location of vineyard, grape varieties
planted or production methods used. Winery characteristics that can be observed by
growers are denoted as ze, and are assumed to include the type of processing technology
employed (e.g. type of oak barrels), the size of vintage and the brand name. These
attributes, denoted by z =
[
zTa z
T
e
]
, are a reﬂection of the contract terms to which
both parties have committed to. They also form the basis for the monetary valuation
of wine attributes by consumers and marketers at the retail level, as these attributes
are assumed to be visible on the wine bottle or elsewhere in the marketplace.19
Not only are winery ﬁeldmen assumed to monitor grape growers, but we also assume
that winery monitoring is observed, such that growers infer winery processing and
marketing eﬀorts from winery reports, trade publications and other industry partici-
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pants. The resulting `monitoring scorecards' (grades) are weighted by a contractually-
determined matrix V , which reﬂects the relative importance that a given eﬀort is
perceived to have for the ﬁnal outcome from contracting. Further, we assume that
matrix Q converts eﬀorts w into grades, such that each eﬀort that has been monitored
receives a single grade (diagonal matrix), or several eﬀorts are used to determine a sin-
gle grade. Therefore, we assume that v˜(s)=V Qw, and in order to convert these grades
into monetary terms, we assume that zT [V Qw]. The total performance indicator of
the sharing contract is thus,
µ = zT [(Φ(w + εw) + εk) + V Qw]. (4)
To summarize notation and model structure so far, consider Table 1:
Table 1: Notation and structure of performance measure
(I) OUTPUT INFORMATION
w · eﬀort (variable inputs)
w˜ =w+εw · observable eﬀort (with observational noise), E(εw)= 0
q =Φw˜+εk · `production function' (with external shocks), E(εk)= 0
Φ · productivities
z · contract provisions (e.g. grape variety planted, type of oak barrell)
(II) SUPERVISION
s =Qw · information outcome of monitoring activity
V · weights on monitored variables
zT [V Qw] · conversion of monitoring grades into Dollars
v˜(s) =V s ⇒ performance indicator µ = zT [(Φ(w + εw) + εk) + V Qw]
w : (N +M)× 1 εw : (N × 1), εk : (M × 1)
q : (M × 1) ⇒ Φ : (M ×N)
v : (M × 1) ⇒ V : (M × S)
s : (S × 1) ⇒ Q : (S ×N)
The timeline of the model is as following. When the contract is signed, the winery
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puts forward a sharing rule to the grower. As part of this sharing rule, both parties
agree that certain weights will be placed on the informational outcome from monitoring
activities. Given the information from monitoring, we obtain v˜(s). The contract also
speciﬁes that grape growers are compensated based on retail prices of the forthcoming
bottles from the current vintage. After both grower and winery have committed their
eﬀorts, and wine is produced, we observe to which contract terms z they have adhered
to. This is a reﬂection of their production function that transformed eﬀorts with
observation noise εw, and in the presence of random shocks εk. Assuming that these
contract provisions z have market value and are ultimately responsible for the price
of the bottle of wine, we generate revenue that can be shared through a performance
indicator as in (4).
The underlying cost-of-eﬀort function (`disutility') is assumed convex and monotone
increasing, since the cost-of-eﬀort matricesK1 andK2 are assumed symmetric positive
semideﬁnite and considered in monetary terms:
Assumption 1. C
′
w(w) > 0, C
′′
ww(w) ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ RN ,
where C
′
w(w) =
∂C(w)
∂w and C
′′
ww =
∂2C(w)
∂w∂wT .
Hence, C1(a) = 12a
TK1a deﬁnes the grower's quadratic cost of eﬀort, and C2(e) =
1
2
eTK2e denotes the winery's quadratic cost of eﬀort. Therefore C(w) = 12w
TK3w,
where
K3 =
 K1 Ka,e
KTa,e K2
 . (5)
Since the cost-of-eﬀort matrices K1 and K2 are assumed symmetric positive semidef-
inite, we can represent eﬀorts as substitutes in the grower's and winery's cost-of-eﬀort
function, respectively. In those cases we assume that if the incentive intensity is in-
creased on one eﬀort, this will cause substitution away from other types of eﬀorts.
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Given the outcome from monitoring and the outcome from grape and wine production
as in equation (4), we assume that the optimal second-best incentive scheme takes the
following linear form,20
l˜ = α(zT [(Φ(w + εw) + εk) + V Qw]) + β, (6)
where α denotes the commission rate on the dollar outcome. The size of α reﬂects thus
how strongly powered the incentives are for the grower such that in a high-powered
incentive contract, the agent's total returns will be relatively sensitive to the contracting
outcome. If α = 0, the grower ceases to be an independent supplier, whereas with
α = 1, the grower would become a fully residual claimant. The scalar β denotes a ﬁxed
ex ante base payment upon which grower and winery agree when signing the contract.21
We could modify our sharing rule further, such that another parameter is determined ex
ante to the allocation of grower and winery eﬀort. Instead of leaving the relative weights
allocated to production outcome vs. monitoring outcome in the performance indicator
unspeciﬁed, both parties could agree ex ante on a base split that is variable: the quality
outcome from production could, for example, be linked with the performance of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI), resulting in a ﬂexible sharing rule over λ:
E[µ?] = zT [λΦ + (1− λ)V Q]w = zTM ?w (7)
Indeed, linking wine bottle contracts to the CPI is practiced in the Australian wine
industry (Scales, Croser, and Freebairn (1995), Fraser (2002)). However, since this
modiﬁcation does not change the key results in which we are interested, we will proceed
as in (6).
Given equation (6), the winery's problem is to allocate the surplus such that expected
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proﬁts are maximized, subject to the constraints that the winery and the grower com-
ply with the eﬀorts speciﬁed in the contract, and subject to the condition that the
reservation utility for the grower is assured. While the resulting contract is assumed
to be eﬃcient, it leaves the surplus allocation unspeciﬁed since retail prices are unob-
served ex ante: the winery only chooses α and agrees with the grower on the weights
that shall be placed on the monitoring outcome.
Assuming a risk-averse grower, we are interested in the variance of the payment scheme
(6), as this serves to derive the risk premium. Further, through the covariance matrix,
we can analyze random complementarities between tasks. Random complementarities
arise when the random allocation of eﬀorts to one quality task increases the marginal
expected beneﬁt of allocating eﬀorts to another task, as a result of a random positive
demand shock.22 From (6) we obtain,
Var(µ(a, e, z)) = E(zT (Φεw + εk)(Φεw + εk)
Tz) (8a)
= zT (ΦΣwwΦ
T + ΦΣwz + ΣzwΦ
T + Σzz)z, (Σij = εiε
T
j ) (8b)
≡ zΣz (8c)
where
Σ =
 Σa,a Σa,e
ΣTa,e Σe,e
 .
Given the above sharing rule as in equation (6), the grower proﬁts are given by
Πa = αµ− 12aTK1a+ β. (9)
From the moment generating function for the multivariate normal, ε ∼ N(0,Σ), we
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obtain the CARA expected utility of proﬁts as,
E[u(Πa)] = −exp{−r(αµ+ β − 12aTK1a) + 12r2α2zTΣz}, (10)
where r denotes the constant absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient, r = −U ′′/U ′, r > 0.
Noting that,
E[µ] = zT (Φ + V Q)w (11a)
≡ zTMw = zTaM aaa+ zTaM aee+ zTeM eaa+ zTeM eee, (11b)
it follows that the certainty equivalent for the grower is,
CE = α(zTMw) + β − 1
2
aTK1a− 12rα2zTΣz. (12)
The certainty equivalent utility is thus given by the expected compensation minus the
private cost of eﬀorts minus the risk premium. As long as the certainty equivalent
utility satisﬁes the grower's reservation level, he will accept the contract. However,
since we assume that contracting takes place in an environment of randomness in
ex post observed retail prices, the associated information asymmetries require that
incentive compatibility constraints are met. In setting up the incentive compatibility
conditions, we assume that the grower chooses his own eﬀorts a such that the winery's
expected proﬁts are maximized. This optimization problem of the grower excludes the
eﬀort choice of the winery, e, but includes the variance-covariances since we assume a
CARA model of grower choice:
a ∈ arg max{α(zTMw) + β − 1
2
aTK1a− 12rα2zTΣz}. (13)
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The necessary ﬁrst order conditions for (13) are thus,
α(zTaM aa + z
T
eM ea)− aTK1 ≤ 0, (14a)
a ≥ 0, (14b)
a
[
α(zTaM aa + z
T
eM ea)− aTK1
]
= 0. (14c)
Assuming that an interior solution exists, we can solve (14a) as a system of equalities
for a, such that
aˆ(e) = αK−11 (M
T
aaza +M
T
eaze). (15)
Since equation (15) reveals the level of grower eﬀort that maximizes the grower's certain
equivalent income in (12), it gives us the incentive compatibility condition that needs
to be satisﬁed to achieve a feasible contract.
In the following step, we substitute the grower's eﬀort choice function (15) into the
grower's certainty equivalent income function (12) to obtain the indirect certainty util-
ity of the grower. Denoting
E[µ] = δa[µ(a)] + δe[µ(e)],
we can write the indirect certainty equivalent as,
ĈE(α,a) = β + αδa[µ(a)] + αδe[µ(e)]− 12aTK1a− 12rVar(αµα). (16)
Together with the participation constraint,
β + αδa[µ(a)] + αδe[µ(e)]− 12aTK1a− 12rVar(αµα) ≥ U(v), (17)
in which U(v) is the default utility level of the grower and v is its certain monetary
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equivalent. As long as the certainty equivalent utility is greater than the default utility
of the grower, the grower's performance incentives are not aﬀected, and β serves only
as a redistribution (surplus transfer) between winery and grower without aﬀecting
the agent's performance incentives (Holmström and Milgrom 1994).23 From (17), an
inequality constraint is implied on the winery's choice for the ﬁxed base payment β:
β ≥ v − αδa[µ(a)]− αδe[µ(e)] + 12aTK1a+ 12rVar(αµα). (18)
Thus, to induce the grower's voluntary participation we impose a participation con-
straint, which, together with the incentive constraint, is necessary to deliver an incen-
tive feasible contract.
For convenience, let K1 =
K−11 0
0 0
, K2 =
0 0
0 K−12
, such that K1 +K2 = K−13 .
Considering the grower's optimal eﬀort level from equation (15),
E(µ(aˆ)) = α(zTaM aaK
−1
1 M
T
aaza + z
T
aM aaK
−1
1 M
T
aaze (19a)
+ zTeM aaK
−1
1 M
T
aaza + z
T
eM eaK
−1
1 M
T
eaze) (19b)
= αzTMK1M
Tz. (19c)
Given the winery's proﬁt function as,
Π = (1− α)µ− 1
2
eTK2e− β, (20)
the expected proﬁt criterion becomes,
E(Πe) = (1− α)E[µ]− v + αδa[µ(a)] + αδe[µ(e)]− 12aTK1a− 12rVar(αµα). (21)
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From (21) we know that the participation constraint is binding since E(Πe) is strictly
decreasing in β. Together with a strictly positive reservation utility of the grower v,
we know that grapes and wine are produced.
In order to obtain the winery's unconstrained maximization problem, maxa,eE(Πe),
we substitute the right-hand side of (15) for a in (21), and the right-hand side of (18)
as equality for β into (21). The optimal level of winery eﬀorts is thus given by,
∂EΠe
∂e
= (1− α + αδe)(zTaM ae + zTeM ee)− eTK2 (22)
This yields
ê(a) = (1− α + αδe)K−12 (MTaeza +MTeeze). (23)
Therefore equation (19c) becomes,
E[µ(ê)] = (1− α + αδe)zTMK2MTz, (24)
which yields unconstrained proﬁts of the winery,
max
a,e
E(Π̂e) = z
T [(1− α + αδa − 12α)αK1
+ (1− α + αδe − 12(1− α + αδe))((1− α + αδe)K2)M
T
− 1
2
rα2Σ]z
(25)
= zT [M{(−α− 3
2
+ α2δa)K1
+ 1
2
(1 + α2 + α2δ2e − 2α− 2α2δe + 2αδe)K2}MT − 12rα2Σ]z.
(26)
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In order to ﬁnd the optimal level of winery eﬀorts,
∂E(Π̂e)
∂α
= zT [M{(1− 3α + 2αδa)K1
+ (α + αδ2e + 1− 2αδe + δe)K2}MT − rαΣ]z = 0
(27)
Therefore,
α? =
1
1 + r
(
zTΣz
zTMK
−1
1 M
Tz
) (28)
Several comparative static results can be obtained by considering the optimal share
parameter α? and by varying our assumptions with regard to the degree of eﬀort con-
tractibility, the grower's risk aversion and the grower's disutility of eﬀort:
Proposition 0.1. As long as the grower is risk-averse, and observational error in mea-
suring quality and randomness on the supply and demand side is present, the optimal
contract involves strict sharing:
Proof.
if εw, εk, r > 0 ⇒ {α : 0 < α < 1}
Q.E.D.
Proposition 0.1. is consistent with previous evidence of strict sharing (i.e. the optimal
contract cannot have α = 0 or α = 1) in the presence of double-sided moral hazard,
when both parties are risk-neutral and only a single task is performed (Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine (1995), Collary 1). Proposition 0.1. suggests that, under the above
model conditions, strict sharing extends to double-moral hazard settings when agents
are risk-averse.
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Proposition 0.2. As the magnitude of the grower's disutility of eﬀort increases, and
with increasing weight which is placed on the informational outcome of supervision, the
Pareto optimal share which goes to the grower decreases.
Proof.
as ‖K1 ‖→ ∞ , V Qw →∞ ; α? → 0
Q.E.D.
From Proposition 0.2., we would anticipate that as a grower's disutility of eﬀort in-
creases (for example, by expanding into the production of higher quality grapes), the
role of monitoring in the incentive contract increases, and a greater Pareto share goes
to the winery.
Evidence from Australia and California suggests that the use of production practice
provisions (indirect monitoring) and a high direct monitoring intensity is predominant
in high-quality grape regions (Scales, Croser, and Freebairn (1995); Goodhue, Heien,
Lee, and Sumner (2004); Fraser (2005)). The more extensive use of production practice
provisions in grape supply contracts of high quality regions is likely a reﬂection of the
diﬃculty of identifying and measuring the key grape characteristics that determine
grape and thus wine quality (Scales, Croser, and Freebairn 1995).24 This suggests that
the winery uses these provisions as an indirect monitoring mechanism in an attempt to
address the incentive problems created by multitasking, when grower eﬀorts between
quality tasks diﬀer in measurability at harvest time.
Further, in those cases where wineries contract with high quality grape growers, we
anticipate that these wineries, which are likely facing greater multitasking problems
and thus higher processing quality risks, receive a higher Pareto share. This increasing
Pareto share could thus be expected to be associated with an increasing internalization
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of contracting externalities associated with multitasking. We would expect that winer-
ies aim to internalize those externalities of incentive design by backward integrating
grape production into their own operation, which is indeed reﬂected in recent empir-
ical evidence from Australia (Scales, Croser, and Freebairn 1995) and Spain (Olmos
2008).25
In particular, we observe that production practices in high quality regions encompass
the use of winery and wine-speciﬁc grape varieties (Scales, Croser, and Freebairn 1995),
such that wineries supply growers with new vines on the condition that they have a
right to buy the vintage from those vines for a certain number of years (Boyd, Evans,
and Quigley 2000).26 Thus, we have some evidence that the boundary of the ﬁrm shifts
towards wineries in cases where multitasking problems are likely to be more signiﬁcant.
The prediction that a diﬀerent pattern of asset ownership and monitoring intensity
between high and low-quality grape growing regions can be related to the extent of
the multitasking problem, could also be contrasted to the analysis of Baker and Hub-
bard (2002). In Baker and Hubbard's (2002) study of the trucking industry, more and
improved monitoring technology leads to more integration of trucking into the princi-
pal's boundaries, as more asset ownership of the principal is associated with improved
incentives. Considering the asserted diﬀerences of asset ownership in grape growing
regions of diﬀerent quality, we would expect that the improved eﬃciency of the back-
ward integrating winery should be accompanied by a greater Pareto share that goes to
the winery. Further, from Baker and Hubbard (2002) we would expect that the pre-
diction of increasing backward integration strengthens in light of greater technological
advances which are associated with grower monitoring and grape quality measurement.
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Proposition 0.3. With increasing uncertainty of measuring eﬀort contribution, it be-
comes more eﬃcient to allocate a greater Pareto optimal share to the less risk-averse
party:
Proof.
When εw, εk >> 0, r →∞ ; α? → 0.
Q.E.D.
Considering the uncertainty of measuring bilateral eﬀorts, Proposition 0.3. extends
insights of previous single-sided moral hazard multi-tasking studies (Holmström and
Milgrom (1991), Holmström and Milgrom (1994)) under the above model conditions.
It also extends insights of previous double-sided moral hazard models (Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine 1995) with regard to the prediction of varying degrees of risk aversion,
since the model of Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) abstracts from a risk-averse
agent.
Proposition 0.3. is consistent with evidence that more backward integration is ob-
served in high-quality regions (Scales, Croser, and Freebairn (1995); Boyd, Evans, and
Quigley (2000)). This is in line with our model prediction, since in those wine produc-
ing regions, in which (i) eﬀort allocation inference problems and (ii) quality shocks due
to states of nature and related moral hazard issues are most likely to be prevalent (i.e.
high quality wine regions where both the likelihood and the magnitude of states of na-
ture and their quality implications is expected to be most signiﬁcant), it is likely more
eﬃcient to allocate the winery a greater Pareto share through backward integration.
Furthermore, in those instances ((i) and (ii)), it is also likely more eﬃcient to allocate
the winery as the less risk averse party a larger Pareto share, since it can bear these
risks more eﬃciently than the grower.
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Conclusions
This paper has explored internal organizational design problems of ﬁrms in the wine
industry, which can arise from the complexity of aspects of performance and the interre-
lationship between incentive instruments. It has analyzed an eﬃcient sharing contract
under the assumption that sharing relates both to the information from monitoring
eﬀorts, as well as to the market valuation of joint production outcomes. The wine in-
dustry uses residual claimancy as an instrument through such outcome-based incentive
contracts.
In order to explore the agency relationship between a grape grower and a winery over
the supply of grapes for wine production, a multi-task model is developed which en-
compasses revenue sharing and double-sided moral hazard. The model allows for asym-
metric quality contributions of the contracting parties, and shows that strict sharing
can also be supported in bilateral moral hazard settings when agents are risk-averse.
Its comparative static results provide insights into what factors determine the alloca-
tion of the Pareto optimal share between the contracting parties. Resulting from the
comparative static analysis of the Pareto optimal share, the model sheds some light
into empirical evidence on diﬀerential contracting use in the wine industries of Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, California and Spain. Since organizational issues and behavioral
assumptions that are accounted for in our model are likely to play a key role also in
other industry contexts, the insights derived may be useful when studying other labor,
health or innovation contracts.
Our model has made a number of convenient assumptions and has thereby left aside
important issues that warrant further analysis. Given the static nature of the model, it
ignores ex post contract renegotiation and an analysis of its consequences (Tirole 1999).
The model implies equality in bargaining power between grape grower and winery in
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implementing contracts. Although we have provided evidence that potential hold-up
due to relation-speciﬁc investment appears to be limited, and that overall, the balance
of bargaining power is not consistently skewed toward the winery, ongoing industry
consolidation at the processor level in increasingly global wine markets could change
this in the future. Although the model has taken random complementarities between
tasks into account, we have been unable to test for their implications empirically. We
would expect that Edgeworth complementarities between contracting provisions, as
well as complementarities between asset ownership and contract provisions, could help
further to explain the diﬀerential use of residual claimancy across regions.
Notes
1A major implication of the suﬃcient statistic result is that the principal-agent relationship creates
demand for monitoring when there is uncertainty in production, when the agents are risk-averse or
when they have limited endowments (Hart and Holmström 1987). For the one-dimensional eﬀort
case, Holmström (1979) has used the suﬃcient statistic argument to demonstrate the beneﬁts of
compensating the agent both on output information as well as on information from direct supervision.
When multiple tasks are performed by the agent, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) show that we should
observe diﬀerent degrees of monitoring intensity in agency relationships because of diﬀerences in the
informativeness of performance measures. As they demonstrate in Theorem 4, the informativeness
of performance measures has important implications for asset ownership: with decreasing variance
in the performance measure, we expect that a grower's independent activities will be less curtailed,
through monitoring for example, than otherwise.
2It is well-established that when free-riding occurs as a function of commingling, monitoring can
be an important instrument in remedying moral hazard (Holmström 1982).
3As Milgrom and Roberts (1995) have established, setting intense incentives and measuring per-
formance correctly can be Edgeworth complements. When we refer to complementarities between
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contract provisions, we could consider a broad set of incentive instruments that growers face: the
quality bonues and penalties for meeting speciﬁc grape quality characteristics, the incentive intensity
as reﬂected in a bottle-price conditioned grower payment, as well as speciﬁc production practice provi-
sions. The complementary nature between such incentive instruments implies that as one instrument
is used more intensively, the marginal beneﬁt of using other instruments more intensively increases
(Holmström and Milgrom 1994). As Holmström and Milgrom (1994) have shown, it is important
to consider the endogeneity, i.e. the explicit complementary relationship between those incentive
instruments, in order to explain how contracting externalities can aﬀect asset ownership.
4Further, we would expect that moral hazard on the part of the winery emerges when it is responsi-
ble for processing and marketing grapes of multiple growers, even in instances where free-riding due to
commingling grapes from multiple growers is not a problem: due to contractual incompleteness, and
because the winery aims to reduce its overall advertising budget, the winery may favor a particular
grower in terms of providing stronger marketing support after the supply contract has been signed.
5Although Baker (1992) models only the single-task case explicitly, he suggests that the results of
his paper are robust in a multi-task setting (p.602).
6Rubin (1978) has also shown that when the principal has a greater potential impact on retail
demand due to marketing and branding, revenue sharing arrangements can be more suited to provide
appropriate incentives rather than proﬁt sharing.
7Since this paper explores double-sided moral hazard in incentive contracts, it is also related to
the literature on warranties, corporate governance and share contracts. Cooper and Ross (1985) and
Mann and Wissink (1989) analyze product warranty contracts in the presence of two-sided moral
hazard. Demski and Sappington (1991) show that bilateral moral hazard problems can be resolved if
the contract oﬀered by the principal has an option to require a risk-averse agent to buy out the ﬁrm at
a pre-negotiated price. Wang and Zhu (2005) analyze optimal revenue sharing between joint-venture
partners in a two-period double moral hazard model with incomplete contracting.
8In California, which grows more than ninety percent of U.S. wine grapes and which is the fourth
largest wine producer in the world, wine is the most important processed agricultural product with
a $51.8 billion impact on the state's economy, and an economic impact of $125.3 billion on the
U.S. economy in 2006 (Wine Institute, 2007c). Similarly, Australia's wine industry is an important
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contributor to its economy with $2.39 billion wine sales, advancing Australia to the world's fourth
largest exporter (Aylward 2004) and sixth largest wine producer in 2005, after France, Italy, Spain,
the US, and Argentina (AWBC 2008).
9This question is relevant with regard to the following model in section (??), since this model
assumes equal bargaining power between principal and agent.
10Fairweather, Campbell, and Manhire (1999) provide an extensive discussion of two contrasting
positions in the New Zealand wine industry on the issue of tension between contracting grape growers
and wineries. Their analysis suggests that there is no evidence for a one-sided, excessive bargaining
power.
11As in commodity markets, we have ample evidence that the bargaining power rests on the buyer's
(winery's) side in periods of excess (grape) supply (Fraser 2005).
12During price deﬁnition there is no real negotiation with wine growers of appelation. The mer-
chants announce their prices and the wine-growers can decide that they would like to sell their products
to the merchants or not (Sidlovits and Kator (2008), p.17)
13Olmos (2008) reports that 68% of DOC Rioja wineries visit grower vineyards at least three times
per year.
14Formal evidence of this is given by Zylbersztajn and Miele (2005).
15... because quality is not entirely attributable to factors within the grower's control, payment based
entirely on observed quality is likely to place too much risk on the grower. Due to this trade-oﬀ between
incentives and risk sharing, mixed payment schedules composed of a base price and an incentive-related
margin are common (Boyd, Evans, and Quigley (2000), p.8).
16The incentive contract has to provide incentives to both winery and grower, and will be second-
best as long as we assume that the budget-balancing constraint is satisﬁed (see Holmström (1982),
and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) for proof).
17Such a shock that can aﬀect the outcome of the wine-quality-contributing eﬀorts of a given grower
could be a certain disease in the vineyards. After harvest, the grower could thus supply grapes of
lower quality, blaming the pest. However, the winery may contract with other growers from the
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same region, and thus ﬁnd out that the grower in question could have enhanced certain grape (and
thus wine) qualities by additional eﬀort, following the disease incident. Similarly, the winery may be
exposed to an external shock on its quality-contributing eﬀorts that could for example originate from
an input supplier or from the retailer end. A quality shock due to a defective cork may be an example
for the former. Due to extreme weather conditions in a given region (or simply due to a lack of storage
care under regular conditions), the wine retailer may aﬀect the wine quality through its storage quality
eﬀorts, such that a certain wine quality variation that impedes the winery's marketing eﬀorts may
be outside of the control of the winery. A winery may therefore suggest vis a vis its grower that it
suﬀered a quality shock that was outside of its control, originating from the retail level. However, if
the grower would supply the same grapes to multiple wineries (or use some other monitoring device),
he may be able to control to what extent the wine's ﬁnal quality (and thus market success) at the
retail level is due to the winery's processing and/or marketing eﬀort, as well as due to the winery's
unobserved eﬀorts that may enhance a given quality shock which originated from the retailer end.
18The grower can impact the processing abilities of the winery by aﬀecting the fermentation qualities
of the wine. The fermentation process can be impeded by an undesired use of certain pesticides and
fertilizer (Wade, Holzapfel, Degaris, Williams, and Keller (2004), Downey, Dokoozlian, and Krstic
(2006), Lund and Bohlmann (2006)). Further, the ﬁnal bottle quality may be impeded by grape
grower eﬀorts in terms of credence attributes (Darby and Karni (1973), Emons (1997)), even if the
fermentation quality is not aﬀected. Evidence from Australia shows that contracts contain a chemical
use clause due to potential chemical residues resulting from chemical applications to the grapes (Fraser
2005).
19Following the key contributions by Griliches (1971) and Rosen (1974), a number of hedonic studies
have derived implicit prices for wine qualities and labeling attributes ((Oczkowski 1994), Nerlove
(1995), Steiner (2004)). Perhaps most intriguing in the context of our model is the study by Golan
and Shalit (1993), which derives a producer pricing schedule for Israeli grape growers based on the
monetary valuation of wine attributes by California consumers and marketers at the retail level.
20There exists no sharing contract that implements ﬁrst-best under double moral hazard, even with
risk-neutral agents. Holmström (1982) has shown that any sharing rule which satisﬁes the budget
balancing constraint cannot achieve ﬁrst-best outcome in team production.
21We could also let β take negative values, which would allow for the possibility that the grower
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borrows capital from the winery. For example, in Australia, we observe that wineries desire speciﬁc
grape varieties from grape growers in the production of certain wines (Scales, Croser, and Freebairn
1995). Thus, the winery could suggest that the grower invests into new vines, where the investment
will be reimbursed after grape delivery. However, this is likely to turn into a relation-speciﬁc asset with
hold-up potential. Alternatively, wineries could provide capital to growers for converting vineyards
(negative β). Boyd, Evans, and Quigley (2000) provide an example of this from New Zealand.
22In a stochastic environment, the covariation of uncertainty across contract provisions implies that
the grower is exposed to greater compensation risk. Given the greater sensitivity of the grower to a
given incentive (to reallocate eﬀorts) in this environment, we would expect that incentive contracts
are used which are of lower power. Therefore, the optimal share parameter should be decreasing in
random complementarities, where risks are correlated across tasks.
Further, we would expect that more intense incentive instruments are observed together with
higher grower monitoring intensity in high-quality grape growing regions, in which greater quality
uncertainty is observed at harvest. Indeed, evidence from Australia suggests that winery represen-
tatives make signiﬁcantly more visits to growers in higher-quality grape regions (Fraser 2005). From
Australia and New Zealand (Fraser (2005); Boyd, Evans, and Quigley (2000)), we have support for
the hypothesis of a complementary relationship between the intensity of incentives and the intensity
of grower monitoring.
23Also, as we will show below, the eﬃciency of the contract does not depend on the choice of β.
24The various tests currently available to assess grape quality are able to diﬀerentiate between
bad grapes and good grapes, but they cannot provide a good measure of quality as is necessary when
identifying grapes for premium quality wines. (Fraser 2005, p.43).
25From the above, it was emphasized that when α = 0, the winery has fully backward integrated
the grower, whereas when α = 1, the grower is fully autonomous and residual claimant.
26Although Boyd, Evans, and Quigley (2000) do not document whether this procedure is practiced
more in high rather than low-quality regions, we would expect that, given the higher transaction costs
and investment uncertainty involved in high-quality regions, the practice that wineries supply growers
with new vines is more prevalent in high quality regions.
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